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JUSTICE WILLIAM CUSHING AND THE
TREATY-MAKING POWER
F. WILLIAM O'BRIEN, S.J.*
Washington's First Appointees
Although the work of the Supreme Court during the first few years
was not great if measured in the number of cases handled, it would be
a mistake to conclude that the six men who sat on the Bench during
this formative period made no significant contribution to the develop-
ment of American constitutional law. The Justices had few if any
precedents to use as guides, and therefore their judicial work, limited
though it was in volume, must be considered as stamped with the
significance which attaches to all pioneer activity. Moreover, most
of this work was done while on circuit duty in the different districts,
and therefore from Vermont to Georgia the Supreme Court Justices
were emissaries of good will for the new Constitution and the recently
established general government. In every charge to a jury and in
every opinion written they had an opportunity to clarify ambiguous
clauses in the Constitution, to dispel popular suspicion and to mold
public thought relative to the great experiment with Federalism. Most
of these opinions and charges to the juries have never been officially
recorded, but a canvass of contemporary newspapers reveals that they
were widely reported and generally accorded popular support and
enthusiasm.
A survey of some vital statistics might justify the conclusion that
of all the early Justices who participated in this significant work, none
deserves a serious study more than William Cushing, Washington's
second appointee to the high tribunal. Several of those who sat on the
Bench with Cushing surpassed him in native ability, it is true, but
none gave such long and continuous service as did the Justice from
Massachusetts. John Jay, the Chief Justice, retired after five years, as
did John Blair, the appointee from Virginia. James Wilson died in 1798,
and James Iredell passed away one year later. Thomas Johnson, ap-
pointed in 1791, resigned in two years. His successor, William Pater-
son, served until 1806.
Cushing, on the other hand, was a member of the Nation's highest
tribunal from 1789 to 1810, and thus was the only human bridge be-
tween the weak judicial institution of the Jay Court and the firm and
respected structure of the Marshall era. He alone was on hand in the
spring and in the fall, planting principles in little known cases, which
by 1810 had matured and fructified in several celebrated cases. A
* Assistant Professor of Government, Georgetown University.
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promising reward, therefore, would seem to await a study of this
Justice of the Supreme Court.
Because of the timeliness of the subject, Cushing and the Treaty-
making Power of the Constitution has been selected as the topic for
treatment in the following pages.
Pre-Constitution Treaties
During the first decade following the adoption of the Constitution,
few questions caused so much anguish for the infant nation as did that
which concerned the extent of the treaty-making powers of the central
government. Actually, differences on the subject began to emerge al-
most immediately after 1776, and there is reason to believe that Wil-
liam Cushing as Chief Justice of Massachusetts' highest court found
himself in the midst of the controversy early in his long judicial
career.1
In May, 1778, the Continental Congress ratified a treaty with France
which had been concluded in the previous February.2 In 1782, a case
came before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts which in-
volved the State's taxing power over two citizens of France residing
in Boston.3 The defendants pleaded that as subjects of the king of
France, they could not "be subjected to any taxes, imposition, or
duties, other than those which respect real property, by the orders,
laws, or directions of the Supreme power of any of the United States
of America."
One author, writing in 1892, asserted that "the treaty, somehow was
the consideration which turned the scales of justice, and that the
judges had no doubt of their authority to disregard any statute of the
State in conflict thereof. ' 4 Although this writer admitted that many
substantial objections could be made to his conclusions, he nonetheless
clung to his surmise that "the court considered the treaty operating
proprio vigore without the intermediate sanction of any State," and
that the judges applied it in the instant case as "a supererogatory
1. William Cushing of Massachusetts was Washington's second appointee to
the Supreme Court, where he served as an Associate Justice for twenty-one
years, 1789-1810. He was a leading Federalist in his home State and was
the vice-president and, for most of the sessions, presiding officer of the Massa-
chusetts Convention which ratified the Constitution in February, 1788. He was
Chief Justice of the State's Supreme Judicial Court from 1777 to 1789.
2. Treaty of Alliance with France, Feb. 6, 1778, 8 STAT. 6, T.S. No. 82.
3. Thompson v. De St. Pry. This case and a companion case, Thompson v.
De France, are to be found in the archives of the Clerk's office of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Boston. The documents, all hand-
written, contain no opinions but only the Court's judgment. See folio 135 for
the docket dated 1781-1782, especially No. 102781, at 23. Besides Cush-
ing, Nathaniel Sargeant and David Sewall were judges for the February
session.




manifestation of good faith ... towards our Gallic friend and ally."5
On March 1, 1781, the last of the States ratified the Articles of Con-
federation, which vested in Congress "the sole and exclusive right and
power.., of entering into treaties and alliances,' 6 and which enjoined
the States from laying "imposts and duties, which may interfere with
any stipulations in treaties. ' 7 In 1783, the treaty of peace with Great
Britain was concluded, Article 4 of which provided that British credi-
tors would meet with no obstacles in the collection of bona fide debts.8
It was not clear what effect these provisions were to have upon the
operation of certain State laws, and therefore the Massachusetts Legis-
lature instructed Cushing and the other judges of the Commonwealth
that they should continue to abide by the Act of the State, which had
suspended interest on British debts during the period of the War.9
Greatly chagrined by such laws, John Jay, Secretary of Foreign Af-
fairs, prepared a report for the Continental Congress on October 18,
1786,10 and Cushing's home State was the first one to receive his words
of rebuke." It was on March 21, 1787, that the Congress voted unani-
mously for Jay's resolutions one of which contained this significant
passage:
[T]he several states cannot of right pass any act or acts for interpret-
ing, explaining or construing a national treaty.., for ... on being con-
stitutionally made, ratified and published, they become, in virtue of the
confederation, part of the law of the land, and are not only independent
of the will and power of such legislatures, but also binding and obligatory
on them. 12
Peter Yates, a delegate from New York, objected to wording "which
declares the treaty to be a law of the land.... The States, or at least
his state, did not admit it to be such until clothed with legal sanction."
But he finally yielded, since "the words 'constitutionally made,' as ap-
plied to the treaty, seemed ... on consideration to qualify sufficiently
the doctrine on which the resolution was founded."'1 3 Accordingly the
legislatures of the States were advised to repeal in general terms all
5. Id. at 422. Goodell professed himself to be at a loss to see exactly
in what respect the law conflicted with the treaty. My own study of the
documents in Boston has produced additional difficulties relative to Goodell's
conjectures on the Thompson cases.
6. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. VI (1781).
7. Id. art. VII.
8. Treaty of Peace with Great Britain, Sept. 3, 1783, art. IV, 8 STAT. 80,
T.S. No. 104.
9. ACTS AND REsOLvEs OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, c. 77,
at 300 (Mourse 1886).
10. JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS xxxi 781 (Hill ed. 1934).
11. Id. at 784-85.
12. Id. at xxxii, 124-25.
13. The remarks of Yates may be found in 5 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE CONSTITUTION AND DEBATES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE CONFEDERATION 98
(2d ed., Elliot 1861) (hereinafter cited as Elliot, DEBATES).
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acts repugnant to national treaties and to leave the particular inter-
pretation and application to the judges of the State courts.14
Massachusetts responded with surprising dispatch. On April 30, 1787,
its Assembly passed a law which read as follows:
Be it enacted ... that such of the Acts ... of the Legislature of this
Commonwealth, as may be repugnant to the Treaty of Peace, shall be,
and hereby are repealed: and further, that the Courts... are directed and
required, in all Causes and questions . . . arising from, or touching the
said Treaty, to decide and adjudge according to the tenor, true intent
and meaning of the same .... 1 5
There is some evidence that Cushing's court did not wait for this
repeal'6 or even for the resolution of Congress, but prior to either
acted in disregard of the Massachusetts Act of 1784 in the case of
Brattle v. Hinckley and the companion case, Brattle v. Putnam. The
relevant facts are the following: Thomas Brattle of Boston had in-
herited the estate of William Brattle, who in April of 1776 had joined
the British forces.' 7 In a suit to collect his debt from citizens of Massa-
chusetts, Thomas received a favorable decision from the court,18 and al-
though no opinions are extant to indicate the precise line of reasoning
of the judges, the brief judgment of the court furnishes material for
speculation. It reads thus:
After a full hearing of said parties upon said pleas, the Court are of the
opinion that the appellees' plea is insufficient to bar the appellant of the
interest during the war. It is therefore considered by the Court that the
said Thomas Brattle Administrator . . . recover against the said Rufus
Putnam the sum of eighteen pounds, three shillings & three pence .... 19
It is not improbable that John Brown Cutting of Boston had the
Brattle case in mind when he wrote to Jefferson in Paris on July 11,
1788. After referring to a recent Virginia case in which the court de-
14. JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS xxxii, 177-84 (Hill ed. 1934).
15. ACTS AND RESOLVES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, C. 86, at
259 (Mourse 1886). Soon afterwards, similar action was taken by all the
other States. See CRANDALL, TREATIES: THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 39
(1916).
16. Hamilton had argued that even without any act of the State legisla-
tures, the judges were bound to enforce the treaty. WORKS 508 (Lodge ed.)
That the public in Boston was well aware of the asserted conflict is ap-
parent from a long article in the Boston Gazette, July 17, 1786, p. 3, col. 2,
which listed the Acts in the various States forbidding the payment of in-
terest to British creditors and stated they were contrary to the Treaty of
1783.
17. For these facts, see Goodell, supra note 4, at 416.
18. For the court's judgment, see docket dated June-Nov. 1786, folio 363,
364, in archives of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Clerk's Office,
Boston.




clared an Act of the Virginia legislature void as being against the
State constitution. Cutting wrote as follows:
A similar instance has occurred in Massachusetts, when where the
legislature unintentionally trespassed upon a barrier of the Constitution,
the judges of the Supreme Court solemnly determined that the particular
statute was unconstitutional. In the very next session there was a formal
and unanimous repeal of the law, which perhaps was not necessary.20
A. C. Goodell, Jr., who as editor of the Acts and Resolves of the
Province of Massachusetts Bay was qualified to speak, wrote in 1892
that after an exhaustive research, he had discovered no instance in
which the court had struck down a law as contrary to the Massachu-
setts Constitution, followed by a repeal such as mentioned in Cutting's
letter. He concluded, however, that there was a high probability that
Cutting was referring to the Brattle case of late 1786 and to the legis-
lative act of April 30, 1787, which repealed the anti-interest resolve of
1784. The word "constitution," he maintained with persuasive argu-
ments, was often used to refer to the system of government provided
by the Articles of Confederation.
2'
Militating against Goodell's conjecture is the fact that at the very
same September term, the court decided the case of a certain Rev.
Henry Caner of London, formerly rector of Christ's Chapel in Boston,
and ruled as follows:
It is . . . considered by the Court that the said Henry Caner recover
against the said Abijah Houghton, Samuel Joslin & Abijah Houghton Junr.,
the sum of one hundred and forty nine pounds & fifteen shillings lawful
money debt (exclusive of interest during the War viz. from the 19th of
April 1775 to the 20th of Janry. 1783) .... 22
Goodall recognized the difficulty in trying to reconcile these two
decisions, but he speculated that after deciding the Caner case in con-
formity with the Act of 1784, the Court reconsidered and came to the
conclusion that a treaty as interpreted by the National Congress, was
the paramount law and more binding on judges than acts of their own
legislatures.
Even if the surmise of Goodell be accepted, it would not be a
definitive answer to what was Cushing's opinion in 1786 on the con-
troversial subject of national treaties vis-a-vis State laws. The judges
listed for the September term of 1786 for the County of Worcester
were Nathaniel Sargeant, David Sewall, Increase Sumner, and the
20. 1 BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 473 (1882).
21. Goodell, supra note 4, at 423-34. For another author who thought the
conclusion of Goodell highly probable, see Turner, Four Fugitive Cases from
the Realm of American Constitutional Law, 49 AM. L. REv. 818, 828 (1915).
22. Caner v. Houghton, supra note 18.
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Chief Justice William Cushing.P Since the official records show no
written opinions, but only a judgment of the Court, it is not possible
to state for a certainty whether the Brattle decision was unanimous.
As will be pointed out below, there is irrefutable evidence that by
1792 Cushing was an ardent promoter of the theory of the supremacy
of treaties over state laws. However, the following passage from a
charge to the jury delivered at Concord in April, 1783, might cast
some doubt on the conjecture that in 1786 he would have acted with
such deliberate speed and magnanimous instancy to comply with
Congress' request that British creditors be assisted in the collection
of their debts. The pertinent passage reads as follows:
It is left in our own breasts and the rest of the good people of these states,
i.e. by their representatives, whom they see fit to chuse, to say whether
those who have deserted their country in the hour of danger, and have
been the great instigating cause of all its trouble and miseries, . . . shall
now be restored to all the privileges of good citizens . .. ( and] to say
whether we shall now tax ourselves to refund the estates of . . . those,
who were foremost to plot and conspire our ruin.24
It would seem, then, that no conclusive evidence exists that Cush-
ing, previous to the adoption of the Constitution, was a proponent of
strong national powers in the area of treaty-making. There is, however,
every reason to believe that arguments for the two sides must have
come into his purview and that therefore he was prepared for the
gathering storm which would soon break in all its fury upon the
infant nation.
The Constitution and the Ratifying Conventions
The Constitution drafted at Philadelphia in 1787 contained three
principle references to treaties. Article II, section 2 provided that,
"He [The President] shall have power by and with the consent of the
Senate to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present
concur. . . ." Article III, section 2 states that, "The judicial power shall
extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution,
the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their authority.. . ." Article VI, section 2 reads thus:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof and all treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of
the' land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything
in the Constitution or laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
23. Ibid.




These provisions apparently produced no deep cleavages amongst the
Founding Fathers at Philadelphia. Few if any denied that treaties were
to be the law of the land, although several leading delegates argued
that both Houses ought to participate in treaty-making,2 5 or that a
concurrence of two-thirds of all the Senators should be required for
ratification.
26
When the conventions in the several States met to ratify or reject
the drafted Constitution, the treaty clauses were subjected to a most
agonizing reappraisal and the discussions which ensued demonstrate
that the delegates fully understood the vast reservoir of national
power which might be tapped by means of the relevant provisions.
Prominent amongst those who opposed any diminution of this poten-
tial were Iredell, Ellsworth, Wilson 27-all of whom would soon be
colleagues of William Cushing on the Supreme Court.
The opposition polarized around two main points. First, although
'treaties were to be laws of the nation, only one branch of the legisla-
ture was to have a hand in making them, and furthermore, only two-
thirds of those present-theoretically, as few as ten Senators. Second,
the rights of the people guaranteed by their State Constitutions as well
as by the national Constitution were imperiled by the supremacy
clause of Article VI. These objections were given animated expression
by delegates to the Pennsylvania, New York, South Carolina, North
Carolina, Maryland, and Virginia Conventions.
The greater part of the discussion in the South Carolina Convention
centered around these objections and, in the vehement debates which
they provoked, tempers flared and feelings were bruised. Rawlins
Lowndes, the most implacable critic, opened his attack with a rhetori-
cal exaggeration: "Now, in the history of the known world, was there
an instance of rulers of a republic being allowed to go so far? Even the
most arbitrary kings possessed nothing like it."28 Charles Cotesworth
Pinckney chided the speaker for his emotional outburst, reminding
him that "if... [an] individual state possessed a right to disregard a
treaty made by Congress, no nation would have entered into a treaty
with us." 29 This argument was reenforced by David Ramsay, who
asked Lowndes if he "meant us ever to have any treaties at all. If not
superior to local laws, who will trust them?" 30 Unmoved, Lowndes
25. PREScOTT, DRAFTING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 457-60 (1941).
26. Id. at 462-65.
27. 4 Elliot, DEBATES 125 (Iredell); 2 id. 189 (Ellsworth); 2 id. 505-07 (Wil-
son). Paterson and Jay, who subsequently became colleagues of Cushing on the
Court, had already shown themselves to be of like mind with Wilson and
Ellsworth. 5 id. 192 (Resolution 6 of Paterson's plan for a revision of the
Articles of Confederation). See also text and note 10 supra, for Jay's Report
on the Treaty of 1783.
28. 4 Elliot, DEBATES 265-66.
29. Ibid.
30. 4 id. at 270.
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retorted that his "antagonists . . .were capable of giving ingenious
explanations," whereas all he meant was that "no treaty concluded
contrary to the express laws of the land could be valid." Then recalling
that some had remarked that "this new government was to be con-
sidered an experiment," he acidly commented: "An experiment! What,
risk the loss of political existence on experiment! No, sir."31
In the first North Carolina Convention, Mr. Porter counselled care
in adopting a proposal "which might sacrifice the most valuable in-
terests of the community," and "give a power to the general govern-
ment to drag inhabitants to any part of the world as long as they
pleased." He concluded that, "as treaties were the supreme law of the
land, the House of Representatives ought to have a vote in making
thef .... ,32 Mr. J. M'Dowall observed that ten Senators-two-thirds of
a quorum-could make treaties, which "may involve us in any difficul-
ties, and dispose us in any manner, they please." 33 Mr. Spencer com-
mented that treaties "ought at least to have the sanction of the whole
Senate."34 Even the masterful Iredell could not assuage the critics, and
the Convention proposed an amendment to the Constitution that
treaties be ratified only with "the concurrence of three-fourths of the
whole number of the members of both houses respectively."
Wilson was a tower of strength in the Pennsylvania Convention and
defended with his celebrated brilliance the treaty-making provisions of
the Constitution.36 Nonetheless, in September 1788, a special confer-
ence met and proposed several amendments, one of which read that,
no treaty should be "deemed or construed to alter or affect any law of
the United States, or of any particular State, until ... assented to by
the House of Representatives in Congress. '37
Maryland proposed but rejected an amendment stating that treaties
would not "be effectual to repeal or abrogate the constitutions or bills
of rights of the States, or any part of them."38
In the Virginia Convention, Patrick Henry employed all his imagi-
native eloquence to depict the fearsome dangers that lurked in the
treaty-making clauses.
The power of making treaties, by this Constitution, ill-guarded as it is,
extended farther than it did in any other country in the world. Treaties
were to have more force here than in any part of Christendom.3 9
31. 4 id. at 271.
32. 4 id. at 118-19.
33. 4 id. at 13 9.
34. 4 id. at 131.
35. 4 id. at 245.
36. 2 id. at 505-07.
37. 2 id. at 546.
38. 2 id. at 553.
39. 3 id. at 500.
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Suppose you be arraigned as offenders and violators of a treaty made
by this government. Will you have that fair trial which offenders are en-
titled to in your own government?40
You prostrate your rights to the President and Senate. The power is
therefore dangerous and destructive.41
Other similar critics were set aflame by such eloquence and gave warm
expression to their own apprehensions.42 George Nichols attempted to
mimimize the dangers envisioned:
The provision of the 6th article is, that this Constitution, and the laws
of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all
the treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme law of the land. They can by this
make no treaty which shall be repugnant to the spirit of the Constitution,
or inconsistent with the delegated power. . . It [the treaty power] is
sufficiently secured, because it only declares that, in pursuance of the
powers given, they shall be the supreme law of the land. .... 43
Governor Randolph offered his opponents the consoling observation
that "neither the life nor property of any citizen, nor the particular
right of any state, can be effected by a treaty" because "the Constitu-
tion marks out the powers to be exercised by particular departments,"
and therefore "no innovation can take place."44 Madison also tried to
dissipate suspicion by asserting that the President and the Senate
could not "alienate any great, essential right" since "the exercise of the
power must be consistent with the object of the delegation. '45 But
the cool logic of Madison could not extinguish the fires ignited by
Henry's pyrotechnics, and the Convention was forced to adopt an
amendment that commercial treaties should be ratified by two-thirds
of the whole Senate, and treaties touching territorial and navigation
rights by three-fourths of both Houses.46
No evidence is presented that the treaty-making clauses touched off
such explosive debates in the New York Convention. However, John
Lansing, a leading and highly articulate delegate, revealed his own
disquietude-and probably that of others-when he proposed an
amendment "that no treaty ought to operate so as to alter the con-
stitution of any state; nor ought any commercial treaty to operate so
as to abrogate any law of the United States."47
40. 3 id. at 503.
41. 3 id. at 504.
42. 3 id. at 499, 516, 610.
43. 3 id. at 507.
44. 3 id. at 504.
45. 3 id. at 514.
46. Amendment 7, 3 id. at 660.
47. 2 id. at 409. It is not clear what action was taken on the proposal.
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. When one turns to the Massachusetts Convention, he notices with
some surprise that apparently little if any attention was given to the
treaty-making clauses. Cushing, the vice-president and presiding of-
ficer for most of the sessions, prepared a long address for delivery on
one of the final days in order to answer the many objections pressed
by the delegates, but his speech makes no mention of those provisions
which produced such polemics in other States.48 However, one of his
longest and most eloquent passages did refer to the necessity of in-
vesting the central government with strong powers for national pur-
poses in order to relieve unemployment amongst the mechanics and
the merchants in Boston and to allow Americans to compete with
foreign nations on equal grounds. Undoubtedly he had in mind tariff
laws and commercial treaties. Moreover, on January 31, 1788, Sam
Adams, the leader of the powerful faction which for a long time held
out against ratification, finally swung his support to the Constitution,
and one of his stated reasons was the need of a strong central govern-
ment to make treaties. 49 This section of his address is similar to the
speech Cushing intended to deliver about the same day.
Therefore, it seems certain that the momentous question must have
come to the attention of Cushing during the period of ratification and
prepared him for the impending controversy of the next seven years.
Cushing and the Circuit Courts
It is extremely interesting, in view of the above-discussed contro-
versy, that the first time federal judges declared any State law un-
constitutional should have involved the treaty powers of the new
government. On April 28, 1791, Cushing and Jay, while in the Eastern
Circuit, ruled that "the state law enabling the State Courts to deduct
interest" from British debts for the period of the war "was an in-
fringement of the treaty of peace." 50 A Hartford newspaper reports
the same case in the form of a "death" notice for the revelant State
law:
Died last Thursday, much lamented by those who wish to defraud their
creditors, an act or law of Connecticut, entitled "An act relating to persons
who have been and remained within the enemies power, or lines, during
the late war". The statute had received its death wound by the adoption
of the new Constitution, and hath languished in extreme anguish ever
since. On Thursday, the 28th, the two-sword of justice gave its last fatal
stroke and it expired without a groan.51
48. This hand-written manuscript is among the documents in the Cushing
Papers in the Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston. Since none of the
historians mention this speech, it seems rather certain that Cushing did not
deliver it at the Convention.
49. 2 Elliot, DEBATES 124.
50. Massachusetts Spy, May 12, 1791. Note that by the Act of September
24, 1789, 1 STAT. 74, three circuits were established and two Justices assigned
to each. The Supreme Court as a whole transacted little business of con-
sequence during the first three or four years of its existence.
51. Connecticut Courant, May 12, 1791, p. 3.
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Since this was the first time that the new federal Courts ever used its
power to nullify a law of a State, it is unfortunate that no written
opinion of either Cushing or Jay has been preserved, and that news-
paper accounts must be relied on to gather the meagre facts. Suf-
ficient information, however, is supplied to indicate that this case
was probably identical with the Brattle case, discussed above, and
therefore weight is added to the conjecture that as early as 1786 Cush-
ing may have ruled that a Massachusetts law was against the British
Treaty.
In 1793, Cushing was involved in another case of even greater magni-
tude. At that time, the United States Government was making supreme
efforts to maintain its neutrality between England and France, only
to be continuously harassed by the boldness of the French Minister
Genet and by certain adventurous American citizens, who relying on
the strong pro-French sentiment existing in many of the States, were
fitting out privateers in this country and bringing back captured ves-
sels into our ports.52 No Federal criminal statutes existed under which
American citizens could be punished for such actions, although our
treaty with England demanded that nothing be done by our subjects to
breach the peace. Moreover, on April 22, 1793, Washington had issued
his famous Proclamation of Neutrality. 3 Since anti-federalist State
judges and State officials sympathized with the French cause, the viola-
tion of our ports and territorial waters could not be stopped unless
the Federal Courts would presume to apply the Proclamation as a
legislative act or invoke the Treaty of 1783.
In November of 1793, Cushing, on circuit duty in Georgia, opened
the court in Atlanta by delivering "a judicious and animating charge"
to the grand jury, dwelling "much on the principles of our Constitution
and the excellence of the laws founded on the Constitution."M The
attorney general of the United States then preferred a bill of indict-
ment against Joseph Rivers, Richard Seymour, Jesse Hunt, and Ben-
jamin Hunt, for fitting out a privateer in the port of Savannah, under
a French Commission, "contrary to the existing treaties between the
United States and foreign powers, and also to the President's Procla-
mation." The opinions given by Cushing and District Judge Pendleton
were substantially the same. The Constitution, they insisted, declares
that treaties existing at the time of its adoption as well as those yet
to be adopted were the Supreme law of the land, and judges were
bound by them, notwithstanding State laws or State Constitution.
55
52. 1 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 105-14 (1937).
53. The press was stirred by the prospect of having the proclamation ap-
plied as a legislative act. 1 Warren, op. cit. supra at 113.
54. American Mercury (New York), Dec. 12, 1793, p. 3. The case has not
been officially reported so that newspaper accounts must be relied upon
for the facts.
55. Id., Dec. 13, 1793, p. 2.
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In the present case, it was declared, the jury, being judges both of law
and of fact, were bound in the same way.
The two judges then pointed to the 7th Article of the Treaty with
Great Britain which declared that there should be perpetual peace
and amity between the respective governments and the citizens and
subjects of each. This provision was a rule of law,-"by way of pre-
eminence, a supreme law,"-and it clearly demanded peaceful conduct
on the part of the citizens of the respective nations towards each other.
In defense it had been pleaded that the 22nd Article of the French
Treaty had authorized the fitting out of privateers: but Cushing and
Pendleton rebutted this, first, by declaring that such extensive power
could be claimed only by implication, and secondly, that it certainly
could not be claimed for any but French citizens at the very most. As
for the status of the defendants, the judges admitted that the citizen-
ship of two might be open to question, but there was no doubt that
the other two were residents and citizens of Georgia. Nor would the
mere entrance of the service of a belligerent be sufficient to cancel
their allegiance to the United States and put them beyond the jurisdic-
tion of the courts of this country.
It seemed perfectly clear to the two judges that the men were guilty
of a criminal act. The jury retired late at night to deliberate, but did
not require much time to come to a decision. At ten o'clock the twelve
men filed back into court, and the foreman read the verdict: Not guilty.
Such a decision was a blow to the national-minded Cushing and in-
dicates how jealously Georgia guarded her sovereignty against any
possible infringement from the recently established general govern-
ment.56
The Ful Court Speaks
In February 1794, in the case of Georgia v. Brailsford,5 7 the full
Supreme Court finally concluded a long drawn out case that involved
the question of the validity of a State law in conflict with a national
treaty. Early in 1792, Iredell had judged in the circuit court that the
British Treaty had repealed the Georgia State law sequestering British
debts. 58 He therefore ruled that Brailsford, a British creditor, could
recover debts from Spalding, his Georgia debtor. Accordingly, the
marshal of the circuit court had collected part of the debt from Spald-
56. Georgia had been so aroused by the Court's ruling in Chisholm v. Georgia,
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (permitting a citizen of another state to sue
Georgia), that her House of Representatives passed a bill five days after the
Rivers decision which declared that any federal marshal attempting to
execute the process should be hanged without benefit of clergy. 1 WARnREN,
op. cit. supra note 52, at 101-02.
57. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794).
58. See Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402, 405-06 (1792), for
reference to the circuit court decision. See also Gazette of the United
States, May 16, 1792.
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ing, but at this juncture Georgia filed a bill in equity against the
latter, praying that an injunction issue from the Supreme Court stay-
ing this money in the hands of the marshal.
The case came before the Supreme Court initially in 1792, and it is
interesting that in the very first case in which opinions of the Justices
were reported, Cushing filed a relatively long dissent.59 Three of the
majority opinions reveal curious mixtures of doubts, misgivings, and
confusion. Iredell, who had already ruled so emphatically against
Georgia in his circuit opinion, now voted for issuing the injunction
in order that "justice will be done to Georgia."60 Wilson made an
honest confession that he had "not been able to form an opinion which
is perfectly satisfactory to my own mind."'61 Jay admitted that his
"first ideas were unfavorable to the motion," but that the presentation
of many facts had operated "to produce a change of opinion. '62 Only
Blair was at peace with himself in supporting the decision.63 Johnson
dissented merely because he believed the facts alleged in the bill did
not state sufficient grounds for asking for an injunction.6
Cushing dissented in an opinion which gives fresh evidence of the
strictly judicial mind, but which also demonstrates how his rigid
legalism forced him to depart from a realistic view of the concrete
problems involved. One can see also a certain disconcern for state
rights and an over-tenderness for the creditor class of society. Cushing
stated that he opposed granting the injunction because one of the pro-
visions of the Judiciary Act of 1789 expressly forbade the Court to
exercise its equitable jurisdiction where a "plain, adequate, and com-
plete remedy may be had at law. '65 But his suggested remedies would
seem to be extremely illusory if Georgia were not here and now
granted an injunction against execution of the order of the lower
court until the Supreme Court had time to decide upon the merits of
the case. Georgia, he maintained, would have its claim presented when
Spalding had sued out a writ of error and then the Supreme Court
would review the circuit court's decision and "decide it as a question
of law." But, as the bill of equity charged, there were good grounds for
suspecting that there had been "a confederacy between the parties"
59. Id. at 407.
60. Id. at 406.
61. Id. at 407.
62. Id. at 408. These three opinions evoked a biting letter from Edmund
Randolph, who argued the case for Georgia. Thus he wrote to Madison:
"rJay] aimed at the cultivation of Southern popularity; . . . the Professor
[Wilsoni knows not an iota of equity; . . . the North Carolinian [Iredell]
repented of the first ebullitions of a warm temper; . . . it will take a score
of years to settle, with such a mixture of Judges, a regular course of chan-
cery." Letter quoted in 1 WARmEN, op. cit. supra note 52, at 104.
63. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 406.
64. Id. at 406.
65. Id. at 407.
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and that Spalding now was perfectly willing to terminate all litigation
by paying Brailsford rather than Georgia. Certainly he had nothing to
gain by asking the Court to review the decision, for win or lose, he
was still bound to pay one of the parties the whole debt. Consequently,
it was scarcely realistic to say that Georgia had a "plain, adequate, and
complete remedy" if that depended on Spalding's willingness to bring
a writ of error.
The second remedy suggested by Cushing was for Georgia to sue
Brailsford after he had recovered his debt. But there was reason to
suspect that Brailsford, a British subject, might very likely collect
his money and return to England, thus putting him beyond the reach
of the law.
This appears to be the serious weakness in the rigid legalism of
Cushing's opinion. On the other hand, he seems to have been techni-
cally correct, a fact that caused the other justices so much misgivings
and tergiversation. As a matter of fact, when the case came up again
in February 1793, Jay and Wilson had been converted by Cushing, and
decided that they could not render judgment while sitting as a court
of equity but that Georgia would have to institute her action at com-
mon law.66 However, the injunction was not dissolved, so that the
State was given one more year to bring its action in the proper form.
This she did in February, 1794, and the Justices then decided unani-
mously against Georgia.6
On the face of it, it may not appear that in this case of Georgia v.
Brailsford in 1794 the State law was invalidated as being in conflict
with a provision of a treaty, for the Court interpreted the word "se-
questration" in the Georgia statute to mean not confiscation but merely
the arrest of payment until the restoration of peace. This, said the
unanimous opinion, Georgia had every right to do and this was all her
legislature had intended to do. However, such was evidently not the
interpretation being given to the statute in 1794 by Georgia's governor
and her attorney general, who argued the case.68 Thus, although by
this expedient the Justices may have avoided precipitating a consti-
tutional crisis in the trying year of 1794, they could not conceal their
intolerance for State laws conflicting with national treaties.
Early in 1794, Cushing had been drafted by the Federalists in
Massachusetts to run for the governorship against Sam Adams and the
campaign was in full swing at the very time that the Court handed
down its ruling in the Brailsford decision. Although the antifederalist
press pilloried Cushing as "an officer in a foreign country . ..who
66. Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 415, at 419 (1793).
67. Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794).




has forsaken Massachusetts and plead in the Federal Court against
her independence," an importation "from another government" and
"the leader of a party, who have pledged themselves to overflow the
Sovereignty of the State Government, ' 69 no mention was made of
the Brailsford or Rivers cases or the 1791 Connecticut case, all of
which involved the treaty-making power. It is probable that Cush-
ing's critics were wholly consumed with anger over the Chisholm de-
cision of 1793,70 which impinged more immediately upon their in-
terest, and that they failed to appraise the implications of the far
more reaching principles being laid down by Cushing and his col-
leagues in the treaty cases.
A clear-cut answer to the provoking question could not be eternally
forestalled, and in early 1796 the Court was called upon for an un-
equivocal ruling. The demand came in the case of Ware v. Hylton l
where the issue was the validity of Virginia's law of 1777, which con-
fiscated debts due to British creditors. No matter what the decision
might be, for several reasons the traumatic consequences were bound
to produce deep anguish throughout the entire nation. The pain most
immediately apprehended was by those who, having already paid
their debts into the State treasury in compliance with Virginia's law,
now feared a judgment ordering them to satisfy their British creditors.
Others, strongly pro-French in their sympathies, were emotionally
disturbed by the prospect of a decision which might give any aid
and comfort to the English. Finally, the case opened up once again
all the wounds suffered in the old constitutional battle over the
treaty powers and the powers reserved to the States.
In May 1793, the redoubtable Patrick Henry had pleaded success-
fully in the circuit court for the debtors, convincing Iredell of the
validity of Virginia's law. Three years later when the case came
before the Supreme Court, in February 1796, it is surprising to be-
hold John Marshall-soon to be the celebrated spokesman for na-
tional supremacy-arguing against "those who would impair the
sovereignty of Virginia."72 But Iredell alone accepted the position
that the Act of 1777 could not be invalidated by a subsequent treaty.
7 3
Cushing's opinion contains the following unambiguous language:
A state may make what rules it pleases; and those rules must neces-
sarily have place within itself.
But here is a treaty, the supreme law, which overrules all State laws
upon the subject, to all intents and purposes; and that makes the dif-
ference....
69. Boston Gazette, April 7, 1794; Independent Chronicle, March 6, 1794.
In the election of April 8, Cushing was decisively beaten.
70. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
71. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). See also 1 WARREN, Op. cit. supra note 52,
at 144-45.
72. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 210-15. For Iredell's opinion, see id. at 256.
73. See id. at 220, 245, 281, for the opinions of Chase, Paterson, and Wilson.
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To effect the object intended, there is no want of proper and strong
language [in the treaty]; there is no want of power, the treaty being
sanctioned as the supreme law, by the constitution of the United States,
which nobody pretends to deny to be paramount and controlling to all
state laws, and even state constitutions, wheresoever they interfere or
disagree.
the treaty, then, as to the point in question, is of equal force with the
constitution itself; and certainly, with any law whatsoever....
I am, therefore, of the opinion, that the judgment of the Circuit Court
ought to be reversed. 74
Cushing's opinion would seem to place an unreasonable burden upon
those debtors who believed that they had satisfied their obligations
by payment to the treasury of the State. However, it is well to point
out that Cushing prefaced his ruling with the observations that Vir-
ginia was bound in "justice and honor" to indemnify citizens who had
complied with the law of 1777.75
The prestige of Cushing with the Federalist Administration was
at its very highest when he penned his opinion in the Ware case.
In January, 1796, ten days prior to the decision, President Washing-
ton had nominated Cushing to the Chief Justiceship to replace Jay,
who had retired on June 29, 1795, and the Senate promptly confirmed
him.76 Although he felt constrained to decline the honor-the only
instance of its kind in the history of the Court-the action of the
President and the Senate afford conclusive evidence that the Fed-
eralists were completely satisfied with his "orthodoxy"- especially
on the controversial subject of the treaty-making powers of the cen-
tral government. This conclusion is underscored by recalling that
one month previously, John Rutledge had been rejected by the Senate
for the Chief Justiceship because of his unrestrained public attacks
on Jay's treaty of 1794.77
The decision in the case of Ware v. Hylton may surely be looked
upon as a vindication of the views Cushing had been expressing for
five years from Connecticut to Georgia. Controversy over the per-
plexing treaty-making powers of the national government did not,
of course, automatically cease. As a matter of fact, on the very day
that the Justices handed down their opinions, the House of Representa-
tives was in the throes of bitter debate over Jay's treaty-the first
74. Id. at 282-84.
75. Id. at 283.
76. 1 WARREN, Op. cit. supra note 52, at 124, 139 n.1.
77. 1 WARREN, op. cit. supra note 52, at 137-38. Cushing revealed his bit-
terness towards critics of the treaty in a letter of June 18, 1795, written to
Jay upon the latter's arrival from England. "What the treaty is has not come
to us with authenticity; but whatever it be, in its beginning, middle or
end, you must expect to be mauled by the sons of bluntness-one of the kinds
of reward which good men have for their patriotism. Peace and American
interests are not the objects with some." Letter quoted in 1 WARREN, op. cit.
supra note 52, at 124.
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ever concluded under the new government-and the whole constitu-
tional basis for such agreements was once more being subjected to an
exhaustive- review.78 Although in the end, the Administration was
triumphant, there is no denying the force of the opposing arguments
nor the stature of the men who moved them.7
9
The fundamental principles of the Ware opinions have been adhered
to by the Judiciary ever since.80 It may thus be considered a leading
case and a climactic event for William Cushing and the Washington
Court.
78. The debates began March 2, and were not concluded until April 30.
See ANNALS OF CONG., 4th Cong., 1st Sess., 426, 430, 437, 444, 524, 763, 772,
940, 946, 969, 979, 1114, 1280, 1295 (1796).
79. In the debates above Madison veered far away from his earlier views
on the treaty powers.
The all-absorbing subject was discussed not only by the high and the mighty.
In Cushing's home state, an unlearned farmer penned a penetrating essay
on government, which contained the following perceptive passages on the
treaty-making clauses of the Constitution:
"The trety-making power which has caused so much rout was as well
guarded as any part of it [the Constitution], but as it has bin exercised, de-
stroys the hole foundation & end the peopel had in makeing of it....
"The letter of the Constitution as it respects the trety stands thus. In
part 1 Sect 1 it saith-All legeslative powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States . . . . & it declares that all powers &
soverantyes not expressly given to Congress, is reserved to the State Gov-
ernments, & all the express powers . . . are enumerated in part 1 Sect 8th
without the least exception for any legeslative athority aniwheir else ....
"Much has bin said about tretys being the Supreem Law of the Land,
which if admitted would finely inlarge the power of the Juditial & innabel
them by constructions to destroy all our laws. But I cant se a word of it in
the Constitution. In part 6th their is a clause that plainly declares that the
Federal Constitution, the federal laws, & all treetys shall be supreme to the
state laws & constitutions but nothing determing which of the three is su-
preem, excepting that it appears reasonable to take them as they stand,
viz:-lt the Constitution. 2dly, the Laws.' 3dly, tretys.
"By such an explanation the Judge is bound by his oath not to give judg-
ment against either of them in favour of a treaty. I would not be under-
stoot that I think tretys are less binding than laws when they are consti-
tutionally made, for it is the duty of the fedral Legeslature to see that the
Constitution, tretyes and laws do not clash with each other, & as their ob-
jects of legeslation are few they are to blame if their is any clash.
"... The plain truth is that the British trety was unconstitutionaly &
treasonably made & those that made it aught to have bin impeached &
brought to tryal immediately. . . ." See 1MANNIG, THE KEY OF LIBERTY 40-
42 (1922). The Manning tract on government was never published until
1922 when Samuel E. Morison edited the original manuscript with notes
and a foreword.
80. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100
U.S. 483 (1879); Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259 (1817); Fairfax
v. Hunter, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 602 (1813).
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